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THE RUNNING WITH THE LAND OF AGREEMENTS TO
PAY FOR A PORTION OF THE COST OF
PARTY-WALLS.
O WNERS of adjoining properties, especially in cities, frequently
find it advisable and advantageous -to enter into arrangements
whereby their buildings shall be supported by a common
wall. These arrangements are ordinarily evidenced by party-wall
agreements or covenants, so-called, out of which have grown a num-
ber of interesting questions.
It not infrequently happens that when one owner desires to build
such a wall his neighbor, for one reason or another, is not ready to
join in the undertaking, so an agreement is entered into between the
two adjoining owners whereby one agrees to proceed with the erec-
tion of the wall at his own expense, the other granting the right to
rest the -wall one-half on his lot and agreeing to pay one-half the cost
or value thereof when he makes.use of it. The details of these agree-
ments may vary almost without limit, but the main features are us-
ually substantially as stated. Quite frequently the parties desire the
benefits and burdens of the agreement to pass to and be binding
upon future owners of the lots of the contracting parties, and the
agreements are then entered into not only on behalf of the parties
themselves, but their heirs and assigns are expressed as being bound,
and frequently there is also a further clause that the agreements or
covenants shall be construed as covenants running with the prop-
erties of the respective parties.
So long as the original contracting parties remain the owners of
their respective lots, not much question can arise as to who is ob-
ligated to pay or who is entitled to receive -such payment when the
wall is made use of. It is when one or both of the lots are sold
that very serious and troublesome questions arise along these lines,
and there has been a lamentable lack of harmony in the decisions.
Although many of the seemingly inconsistent conclusions may be
explained on the basis of the wording of the contracts or the peculiar
facts of the cases, there is clearly a diversity of view on the funda-
mental legal principles involved.
Let us take a typical case: A and B own adjoining lots. A
who is about to erect a building on his lot, desires to enter into an
arrangement with B whereby the wall supporting A's building on
the side toward B's lot may be a party-wall and placed one-half on
the lot of each. B is not then contemplating building presently, 'but
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is willing that A should build a wall of that nature, resting one-half
of it on each lot, on the understanding that whenever he (B) should
desire to build on his lot he may use the wall so built, and shall then
pay A one-half the cost or value thereof. Accordingly a contract is
drawn up and executed by the parties, wherein and whereby it is
provided in substance that A shall build a wall of a certain descrip-
tion, one-half upon the lot of each party, and that whenever B, his
heirs or assigns, shall desire to use said wall they may do so, and
shall then become liable to pay to A, his heirs or assigns, one-half
the cost of said wall, or of so much thereof as shall be made use of.
And it is further provided that the stipulations and agreements con-
tained in said cofitract shall be construed as covenants running
with the land of each party. Now if B should use the wall while A is
still the owner of the adjoining lot, it is clear that B would be liable
to pay to A one half the cost of the wall as provided by the contract.
But suppose B has sold his lot to C and C makes use of the wall to
support a building on his lot, is C liable to A? Or suppose B keeps
his lot and A sells his to D and after that sale B uses the wall, is B
liable to pay D? And to complicate the situation still more, suppose
B sells to C and A sells to D and then C makes use of the wall, is he
liable to pay for a portion of the cost of the wall as provided by the
original agreemeit between A and B? And if so, to whom should
he pay?
It is of course obvious that the answers to these questions depend
primarily upon the general principles regarding covenants running
with the land. It is therefore necessary that we consider the essen-
tial qualities of a covenant that may run with the land, with a view
to determining whether party-wall covenants of the sort mentioned.
may properly be classed among those that may run; after which,
we shall consider very briefly the reported decisions in this class
of cases.
The essential elements of a running covenant are, (I) a privity of
estate between the covenanting parties' and (2) the covenant must
touch and concern the land with which it runs.2 To these may possi-
bly be added a third-it must not appear that it was the intention of
2 Cole v. Hughes. 54 N. Y. 444; Lyon v. Parker. 45 Me. 474; Wheeler v. Schad,
7 Nev. 204; Easter v. Railroad Co.. 14 Oh. St. 48; Hurd v. Curtis. 19 Pick. 459; Hazlett
v. Sinclair, 76 Ind. 488; Webb v. Russell, 3 Term Rep. 393; Keppell v. Bailey, 2 Myl. &
K 517.
2 Wheeler v. Schad. 7 Nev. 204; Gilmer v. Railway Co.. 79 Ala. 569, .8 Am. Rep.
623; Wiggins Ferry Co. v. Railroad Co., 94 IIl. 83; Indiana Nat. Gas Co. v. Hinton, 159
Ind. 398, 64 N. E. 224; Savage v. Mason. 3 Cush. 5oo; Nat'l Bank v. Segur, 39 N. J. L.
173; Spencer's Case. .5 Co. x6 a; Congleton v. Pattison, io Last i3o. (The cases that
might properly be cited in this and the preceding note are almost without number).
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the parties that the covenant should not run.3 From the first resolu-
tion of Spencer's case4 there grew up a doctrine that when the cov-
enant is with reference to a thing not in esse at the time the agree-
ment is entered into, in addition to the elements above stated, "as-
signs" must be named in order to give -to the covenant the running
quality. There seems never to have been any good reason for- this
rule, and in many of the decisions.in the United States, especially in
the later ones, the rule has been repudiated.5 In the States where this
position has been taken the presence or absence of 'the word "assigns"
in the covenant is important only as shedding light upon the intention
of the parties as to whether the covenant should or should not run
with the land so as to.bind the grantees thereof.6
There are few things in the law so confusing as "privity of estate,"
the confusion being largely due, perhaps, to the fact that the expres-
sion is frequently used in entirely different senses. The strict rule
of the early common law (with exceptions not necessary to consider
here) was that the only persons who could sue or be sued for breach
of a contract or covenant were those who were parties to the conven-
tion. Between the contracting parties there was privity Of contract,
and that was sufficient to suppo'r an action as 'between themselves.
:An assignee of the contract could not maintain an action thereon in'
his own name for breach of the contract, -because there was no sort
of privity between him and the parties to the agreement. Privity of
contract is necessarily personal. At a very early time, just when
is uncertain, theregrew up a doctrinethat actions for breaches of cer-
tain covenants could be brought by a person in his own name even
though there was asbetween such person and the defendant no privity
of contract, provided there was a privity of estate between them. Thus
if A leased land to B and covenanted to keep the premises in repair,
and thereafter B assigned his term to C, C could maintain an action
against A in case of breach of the covenant during the time C was
the holder of the term, and the privity was not-of contract but of es-
tate. When A leased to B and made the covenant there was subsist-
ing between them not only a privity of contract, because they had
3A covenant which in its nature is personal cannot be made to run with land no
matter how strongly is expressed an intention that it shall; but a covenant which might
run may be kept from running by an expression of intention that it shall be personal.
See Conduitt v. Ross, xo2 Ind. x66.
45 Co. 16 a.
5 Sexauer v. Wilson, x36 Iowa 357, 113 N. W. 941, 14 L. R. A. (N. S.) x85; Masury v.
Southworth, 9 Oh. St. 341; Kelly v. Railroad Co., 23 Pa. Co. Ct. 177; Ecke v. Fetzer, 65
Wis. 55. 26 N. V. 266; Gilmer v. Railway Co., 79 Ala. s6g, 58 Am. Rep. 623; Flege v.
Bridge Co.. 28 Ky. .. Rep. 1257, 9! S. W. 738. In England the doctrine was doubted
in Minshull v. Oakes, .2 H. & N. 793.
6 Sexauer v. Wilson, supra, and other cases cited in preceding note.
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contracted with each other, but there was also a privity of estate, and
when B assigned his term the assignee stepped into B's shoes
as to the estate, and -the privity of estate which theretofore had exist-
ed as between A and B was shifted. So long as C retained the term
there was privity of estate as between A and C, and when A commit-
ted a breach of -the covenant while C was owner of the term C was
entitled to maintain an action in his own name against A for such
breach.
Just what is the particular thing that creates or amounts to privity
of estate in such cases is perhaps not so clear. Between lessor and
lessee, the covenanting parties, (I) there passes an interest in land;
(2) there is created as between them a relation closely analagous to
the common law tenure,7 and (3) both parties own estates in the
same subject matter. It might possibly be said that any one of these
three things creates or amounts to privity of estate as between the
parties to the covenant. The early common law authorities did not
take the trouble to define precisely what was the particular, precise
thing that constituted the privity. As 'between the lessor and an
assignee of the lessee -the second and third possibiliifes are present,
that is, there is between lessor and assignee of the term that same
relation of so-called tenure, and they both have estates in the same
subject matter. If the privity of estate is or is created by the mere
passing of an interest in land between the covenanting parties, then
the only ground for holding that there is, after the assignment, a
privity of estate between lessor and assignee is the fact that the
assignee has succeeded to the lessee's interest, and so has, quoad the
estate, stepped into the place of the lessee. However, -that in the
case of leasehold estates there is a privity of estate seems never to
have been much doubted, and after the STAT. 32 Him. VIII. c. 34,
covenants were allowed to run with the land and the reversion, ir-
respective of whether the covenant was a benefit or burden.
But in the case of conveyances of lands in fee simple, after the
abolition of tenures as between foeffor and foeffee, the situation has
not been quite so clear. Suppose A conveys lands to B in fee simple
and covenants to keep in repair the buildings on the land conveyed,
and B conveys the lands to C, who sues A for breach of said covenant
while he, C, was owner of the lands. Needless to say there is no
privity of contract between A and C. Is 'there privity of estate?
The English courts and the courts in the United States have held
I In Challis. Real Property (Ed. 3) 424 it is said that tenure is not properly appli-
cable to relation of lessor and lessee. The author observes that the expression "leasehold
tenure," though commonly used, is not accurate, for the reason that terms of years were
mere contracts.
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uniformly that the benefit of a covenant may be attached to and
run with land upon the conveyance of a fee simple estate between
covenantor and covenantee. This doctrine may be explained upon one
of two grounds: first, that the benefit of a covenant may be attached
to land so as to run therewith regardless of privity of estate, or, second,
that the mere conveyance of an interest in land and the succession
-to the rights of ownership therein is the redium creating the privity.
In some jurisdictions the first ground is adopted,9 but undoubtedly-
the great weight of authority is to the effect that the covenant can
be made to run only when there is a conveyance of land, or an
interest therein, between the covenanting parties.10 The conveyance,
then, in the case of fee estates must be the medium of the privity.
In England the burden of a covenant cannot be saddled upon land
so as to bind subsequent owners thereof at law.11 This rule has been
followed in a few of our States. However the great weight of
authority in this country seems clear to the effect that burdens may
be made to run as well as benefits.1 2 If a mere conveyance of land,
or of an interest therein, between the covenanting parties is sufficient
to create privity of estate in order to carry the benefit of a covenant,
it would seem that the same thing would be sufficient to carry a bur-
den. In the case of leasehold estates no distinction is made as to
benefits and burdens; it is not held that one kind of conveyance or
relation is required to carry a benefit, and that something different
is required to carry a burden. So there seems no good reason why
the same sort of privity that carries a benefit should not be sufficient
to allow a burden to run in the case of fee estates.
In Morse v. Aldrich,'5 it was held that a covenant could run with
the land although, at the time of the making of the covenant, there
was no conveyance df land, or of any interest therein, between the
covenanting parties. In that case one Cook conveyed to Hull certain
lands together with the right to take mud from a pond on the remain-
ing lands of the grantor. The interest thus acquired by Hull in
the remaining lands of the grantor was a profit a prendre. Hull
This confusion is largely due to differences in opinion as to the real situation in
Packenham's case, Y. B.. 42 Edw. 111. 3 pl. 14. See Sugden, V. & P. (14th Bd.) 58z,
et seq., also Wald's Pollock on Contracts, 
p. 300.
9 Shaber v. St. Paul Water Power Co., 30 Minn. 179; Horn v. Miller, 136 Pa. 640
(semble).
28Lyon v. Parker. 45 Me. 474; Hurd v. Curtis, so Pick. 459; Gilmer v. Railroad
Co.. supra; Hills v. Miller. 3 Paige 254; Nye v. Hoyle, 120 N. Y. x95; Mygatt v. Coe,
124 N. Y. 212. 26 N. X. 6s,. 1I -L. R. A. 646; Wheeler v. Schad, supra; Miller v.
Noonan. xa Mo. ApP. 37o, 83 Mo. 343; Bull v. Beiseker, x6 N. D. -9o, 113 N. W. 870,
14 L. R. A. (N S.) si4.
nAusterberry v. Oldham. 29 Ch. D. 750.
2 1 Tiffany, Real Property, 752, and cases there cited.
9 Pick. 449.
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conveyed the premises and the rights in -the pond to the plaintiff, and
after this conveyance the plaintiff and Cook entered into a covenant
regarding the drawing off the water of the pond a certain number
of times each year. Cook's lands then came to the defendant, who
breached the covenant. In an action for such breach the main point
considered by the court was whether the covenant bound the lands
in the hands of the defendant, and the precise question was whether
there was privity of estate. In the course of the court's opinion,
WILDE, J., said: "To create a covenant which will run with the
land, it is necessarythat thereshould be a privity of estate between the
covenantor and covenantee. (Citing cases.) In these cases, and in
most of the cases on the same subject, the covenants were between
lessors and lessees; but the same privity exists between the grantor
and grantee, where a grant is made of any subordinate interest in
land; the reversion or residue of the estate being reserved by the
grantor, all covenants in support of the grant, or in relation to the
beneficial enjoyment of it, are real covenants and will bind the
assignee."
And it is the doctrine of a number of courts that the benefit or
burden of a covenant may be made to run with a parcel of land be-
longing to one of the covenanting parties although there has been no
conveyance of that parcel, or of any interest therein, providing there
has been a conveyance betveen them of the land -to which the cor-
responding benefit or burden, as the case may be, is attached, or of
some interest therein.14 Of course it is necessary in such cases, as
it is in all others regarding running covenants, that the covenant
should touch and concern the land to which it attaches.
On the matter of the sufficiency of a conveyance of a mere in-
corporeal interest in land, such as an easement or profit, to create
the requisite privity of estate to carry a covenant, the authorities in
this country and in England are not in accord. The American
courts have uniformly held that the conveyance of such an interest
is sufficient.1 5
Whether a particular covenant touches and concerns the land is
almost as difficult a question as this matter of privity of estate, but
in a different way. It is difficult because there is no way of deter-
mining absolutely, once for all, whether the covenant does as a
matter of fact touch and concern the land. The determination of
24 Fitch v. Johnson, 104 Ill. xix; Scott v. Burton, 2 Ashm. (Pa.) 324; Crawford v.
Witherbee. 77 Wis. 419; Bronson v. Coffin. zo8 Mass. 175. 11 Am. Rep. 335; Hazlett
v. Sinclair. 76 Ind. 488; e aster v. Railroad Co., 14 Oh. St. 48. But see Brewer v.
Marshall, 18 N. J-. Iq 337. x9 N. J. Eq. 537; Waterbury v. Head, 12 N. Y. St. Rep.
361; Clark v. Devoe, 124 N. Y. 120; Dexter v. Beard, 130 N. Y. 549.
a' Sims, Covenants, p. x98, et. seq.
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the presence or absence of -this quality is primarily and fundamentally
a matter of judgment, and judgments differ, even among men equally
intelligent and honest. That certain covenants do touch and concern
the land all authorities agree, and, on. the other hand, it is agreed
with like unanimity that certain other covenants are inherently per-
sonal and collateral to land. Between these two extremes there is a
wide range of covenants of different types, as to which there may
well be differences of opinion. However, the decisions of courts
extending over several hundred years have established certain tests
and have laid down rules which courts should observe and follow in
passing upon this question. While it is true that the determination
of -the problem as to -whether a given covenant in a particular case
does touch and concern the land is a matter of judgment, that judg-
ment should be exercised in view of and with regard to decisions in
analagous cases. Without such an attitude on the part of -the courts
uniformity and certainty in the law are indeed hopeless. 6
A wide variety of covenants have been held to touch and concern.
the land. It is the purpose here to refer only to a few which in their
nature seem analagous to the usual party-wall covenant. Covenants
In Congleton v. Pattison, zo East 130. the question arose upon a covenant by a
lessee of a milU to employ only such persons as were residents of a certain parish. The
court held that the covenant did not touch and. concern the land. Lord FUenborough,
C. 3.. said: "This is a covenant in which the assignee is specifically named; and
though it were for a thing not in esse at the time, yet being specifically named, it
would bind him if it affected the nature, quality, or value of the thing demised, inde.
pendently of collateral circumstances; or if it affected the mode of enjoying it."
In Vernon v. Smith, S B. & AId. z, Best, J.. said: "A covenant in a lease which
the covenantee cannot, after his assignment, take advantage of, and which is beneficial
to the assignee as such. will go with the estate assigned. * * * The covenant' here
mentioned is not beneficial to the estate granted, in the strict sense of the words.
because it has no effect until the estate is at an end. but it is beneficial to the owner,
as owner, and to no other person. By the terms, collateral covenants, which" do not
pass to the assignee, are meant such as are beneficial to the lessor, without regard to
his continuing the owner of the estate." And in Vyvyan v. Arthur. I B. & C. 410,
the same learned. judge said: "The general principle is, that if the performance of the
covenant he beneficial to the reversion in respect of the lessor's demand, and to no
other person, his assignee may sue upon it; but if it be beneficial to the lessor, without
regard to his continuing owner of the estate, it is a mere collateral covenant, upon which
the assignee cannot sue."
In Gilmer v. Railway Co., 79 Ala. 569, the court said: "It is impossible to lay
down any fixed rule by which to distinguish in all cases real covenants, which run with
the land. and are binding as such on heirs, devisees, and assignees, from those which
are merely personal, and are binding only on the covenantor and his personal representa-
tive. The subject is one full of intricate learning, and the decisions of the courts
touching it are greatly conflicting, and far .frorn satisfactory. * * * It is' observed by
Mr. Washburn that such covenants, and such only run with the land. as concern the
land itself, in whosoever hands it may be, and become united with and form a part of the
consideration for which the land, or some interest in it. is parted with between the
covenantor and covenantee. a Wash. Real Prop. (4 th ed.) 286 (x6). And this is,
perhaps, a correct -principle."
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to pay money rent are held, it seems without exception, to run with
the land and -the reversion.17  Covenants by lessors to purchase im-
provements which become part of the realty,'8 and covenants giving
the lessee, his assigns, etc., the option to purchase the fee at a fixed
price or at a figure to be determined in a manner specified, have been
held to run. 9
Now what is the situation in the case of party-wall covenants of
the sort indicated above, with reference to their having the qualities
which seem to be necessary to a running covenant? Upon the exe-
cution of the sort of contract indicated it seems clear that an ease-
ment or profit 0 is thereby granted by the non-builder to the builder,
which easement or profit is the right to use such portion of the
grantor's lot as may be covered by one-half of the wall.2' Whether
there is created, at the same time, a cross-easement in the builder's
lot in favor of the non-builder we shall have occasion to consider
later. In either event it would seem, in view of the authorities above
referred -to, that there has been a sufficient conveyance of an interest
in land to create privity of estate between the covenanting parties.
There has been at least a conveyance of an interest in land from the
non-builder to the builder, and after. such grant, there are in the cove-
nanting parties mutual estates or interests in the same land, as was
the case in Morse v. Aldrich. The decisions in the party-wall cases
holding that the covenants do not run have generally been placed on
grounds other than lack of privity of estate. Whether the covenants
touch and concern the land or are merely personal requires a more
1T Stevenson v. Lambard, 2 last .575; Parker v. Webb, 3 Salk, 5; Williams v. Bo-
sanquet, x Brod. & B. 238; Midgley v. Lovelace, i2 Mod. 45; Salisbury v. Shirley. 66
Cal. 223. g Pac. 104; Allenspach v. Wagner. 9 Colo. 127, io Pac. 802; Baldwin v. Walker,
21 Conn. 168; Webster v. Nichols 104 Ill. x6o; Outtoun v. Dulin, 72 Md., 536; Pfaff v.
Golden, 126 Mass. 402; Stewart v. Railway Co., 102 N. Y. 6ox; Fennell v. Guffey, 139 Pa.
341, 20 Atl. 1048; State v. Martin, 82 Tenn. (14 Lea) 92, 52 Am. Rep. 167.
11 Hunt v. Danforth. 2 Curt. (C. C.) 592, Fed. Cas. No. 6887; Barley v. Richardson,
66 Cal. 416; Frederick v. Callahan. 40 Ia. 31; Stockett v. Howard, 34 Md. 121; La-
metti v. Anderson, 6 Cow. 302; Bailie v. Redway, 27 Wis. 172; Ecke v. Fetzer, 65 Wis.
55, 26 N. W. 266; Hollywood v. First Parish. 192 Mass. 269, 78 N. ]. 124. See also
Thompson v. Rose, 8 Cow. 266, where the court held that a covenant to purchase or pay
for, improvements did not run, not because the covenant did not touch and concern the
land, but because it was with reference to a thing not in else and "assigns" had not
been named.
19 Prout v. Roby 1S Wall 471 (semble); Robinson v. Perry, 21 Ga. 183, 68 Am. Dec.
455; Page v. Hughes. 2 B. Mon. 439; Laughlin v. Perry. 35 Md. 352; Peters v. Stone.
x93 Mass. 179, 79 N. . 336; Van Horn v. Cram, i Paige (N. Y.) 455; Hagar v. Buck,
44 Vt. 285, 8 Am. Rep. 368; Re Adams and Kensington Vestry, 24 Ch. D. 199, 27 Ch. D.
394. But see Woodall v. Clifton, (1905) 2 Ch. 257.
20 In Littlefield v. Maxwell, 32 Me. X34, it was held that if the right granted involved
an exclusive use of the surface of the ground, a profit was created, and not a mere
easement.
21 See party-wall cases hereinafter referred to.
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detailed consideration of the nature of the agreements and of the
rights and relations created thereby.
There is a fundamental difference in the views of the .courts as to
the relation between -the parties created by these party-wall agree-
ments, which difference in vie w' is -the cause, it is believed, of at least
a portion of the seeming conflict of authority on the subject. That
difference is with reference to the ownership of the half of the wall
placed on the non-builder's lot. It seems to be conceded that after
the wall has been used and paid for according to the terms of the
party-wall contract, there is a division of ownership, each one of the
. adjoining owners owning one-half of the wall, and with cross-ease-
ments of support. But -the point of difference js as to whether there
is such cross-easement in favor of the non-builder, and such
severance of ownership of the wall, befote such use and pay-
ment. It is believed that in construing these contracts with ref-
erence to whether or not they touch and concern the land, and
whether the benefits and burdens created thereby run with the lots
of the respective parties, it is a matter of material difference whether
-the half of the wall on the non-builder's lot and -the cross-easement
in his neighbor's wall and lot are- considered as belonging to him ab-
solutely from the date of the contract, or whether the entire wall is
deemed the property of the builder until such time as the non-builder
shall make use thereof and, perhaps, make payment of his propor-
tionate share of the cost. If the view be taken that each one of the
lot owners owns his half of the wall together, of course, with cross-
easements of support, then the real nature of the transaction would
seem to be that the builder has furnished -to the non-builder work,
labor and materials in the building of the half of the wall on the
latter's lot, and the obligation on the part of the non-builder is to
pay for such work, labor and materials at such time as is specified
in the covenant. Under this view, after the work, labor and
materials are furnished, and -the wall built, there exists between the
parties to the contract merely the relation of debtor and creditor, and
under such circumstances it is believed that the agreements, under
the well settled rules regarding running covenants, cannot be made
to pass with the lots of the parties into the hands of subsequent
owners, for the reason that the contract is purely personal and col-
lateral to the land.
On the other hand, it may be the view that the builder owns the
entire wall with the right to have the same rest partly on his neigh-
bor's lot, -that the neighbor, the other covenanting party, acquires no
cross-easement and no rights of ownership even in the half of the
wall on his own land until he makes use of the wall, and that upon
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such use, and possibly not until payment is made therefor according
to the terms of the covenant (depending upon -the manner in which
the covenant is drawn) there is granted to the then owner of the
non-builder's lbt a cross-easement of support and the ownership of
so much of the wall as rests on his lot. If the builder owns the entire
wall, it is a part of -his lot, and upon a conveyance of such lot there
would pass therewith the ownership of the wall. So if there is any
such sale and transfer of a part of the wall and a grant of a cross-
easement as suggested, it must be by, the then owner of the builder's
lot to the then owner of the lot adjacent, the terms of which sale and
grant are determined by -the provisions of the party-wall agreement.
And if that is the real nature of the transaction, it seems clear that
the covenant should be held to touch and concern the land, for it
directly affects its use and occupation, and the authorities hereinbe-
fore cited to the point -that covenants to purchase improvements
placed on demised premises or to sell premises in fee to the lessee
-thereof are closely in point. That. there is such division of owner-
ship and cross-easement created at the time of user and payment has
been the view of the courts in a number of cases.2 2
But there are seeming difficulties in an acceptance of this view.
Ordinarily there does not purport to be a grant of an easement or a
transfer of a part of the wall at the time -the wall is used; such grant
and transfer, being of interests in land, can be made only with the
formalities prescribed by law, such as a sealed or written instrument
and a delivery thereof. Another possible objection is that there is
a violation of the rule against perpetuities. If the covenant is con-
strued'as an option in the non-builder to purchase a part of the wall
and the dross-easement, it would seem under the doctrine of London
& S. W. Ry. Co. v. Gomm, 23 and Woodall v. Clifton,24 that the rule
against perpetuities is violated, for it may not be known, for a period
of time longer than that allowed by the rule, in whom the estate
will vest.
Oddly enough no court in a party-wall case has considered tbese
difficulties, which in itself is a potent, though by no means con-
clusive, argument against the soundness of the suggestions. The first
point, regarding the creation and vesting of an interest in land, may
perhaps be answered on the ground that the party-wall covenant
itself is the instrument of transfer, it appearing that under modern
law a conveyance may operate to pass an interest or estate in futuro.
But this again brings us up against the rule against perpetuities.
2 See party-waU cases hereinafter referred to.
212o Ch. D. 562.
21 (z9os) 2 Ch. 257. See also WVinsor v. Mills, 57 Mass 362.
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Perhaps the position might be taken in answer to the suggested
violation of the rule that the interests in the wall and the cross-
easement are created and vested in interest by the covenant, and that
it is the enjoyment onily which is postponed, thus avoiding both the
matter of the conveyance and the violation of the rule. If this
proposed view were tenable, it would seem clear that the covenant as
to payment would touch and concern the land, it would look to the
future, and should be held to run.
In the following pages will be found a brief consideration of the
cases involving the phase of party-wall covenants indicated by the
foregoing. It has seemed advisable and convenient to take up the
cases classified according to States. Frequent reference will be made
to the benefit of the covenant, and also to the burden. By the former
is meant the right to receive payment according to the covenant, and
by the latter is meant the obligation to make such payment. It
should be noted, however, that as a matter of fact the covenant on
each side is at the same time both a benefit and a burden.
ALABAMA. In Jebeles & Colias Conf. Co. v. Brown,25 an action
was brought -by the vendee of the builder against one who had suc-
ceeded to the rights and liabilities of the non-builder, though ap-
parently not as the non-builder's vendee, to recover one-half the
value of a partition wall. The contract under which the wall was
built provided exptessly that the "covenant shall run with the land
and be binding on the present or future owners." It was held that
the plaintiff should recover. This; then, was a square fiolding that
the benefit runs with the land. The court was not called upon to
decide whether the burden would run with the land of the non-
builder, but that it would so run was clearly the opinion of the court.
ARKANSAS. In Rugg v. Lemley, 26 the complainants, who were
the successors in ownership of the 'builder's lot, brought an action in
equity against the defehdant, the owner of the adjoining lot, -to
recover one-half the cost of a party-wall built by the grantor of the
complainants on the line between the two lots, it appearing that the
defendant's lessee had made use of the wall. The widow of the
builder of the wall intervened, claiming to be entitled to receive
payment on the ground that the original contract between the lot
owners was oral, that the wall therefore was the personal property
of the builder, and that she had, under the will of her husband, be-
come entitled to all his personal property. The report of the case
does not show whether the party-wall contract was as a matter of
fact oral. The court found for the complainants and dismissed the
2 X47 Ala. 593, 41 South. 626.
' 78 Ark. 65, 93 S. W. 57o, xis Am. St. Rep. x7.
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intervenor's bill. In the course of the court's opinion, McCULLOCH,
J., said:
"Under the contract, when the wall was built, the builder
became the sole owner -thereof, with an easement over *the
strip of the adjoining lot built upon, subject -to the right of
the owner of the adjoining lot to use the wall upon payment
of half the cost thereof. The whole wall, together with the
easement over the adjoining lot, passed under the deed exe-
cuted by the builder as an appurtenance to his lot: McChes-
ney v. Davis, 86 Ill. App. 380; Kimm v. Griffin, 67 Minn.
25, 69 N. W. 634, 64 Am. St. Rep. 385.
"The owner of the adjoining lot, by paying half of the
cost of the wall in accordance with the terms 6f the contract,
not only obtained title to that part of the wall which was
built upon his lot, but he also acquired an easement over the
other lot for support of the wall. These consummated rights
he obtained, not from the builder, the original owner of the
lot, but through and from the person who was the owner of
the lot at the time he used the wall and paid the agreed price.
Though the rights of the parties were fixed by the original
contract, yet the enjoyment of them was consummated only
when the agreed price should be paid. [Italics ours.] There-
fore, in contemplation of law, these rights were obtained
through and from the present owner, of the lot and wall, and
he alone is entitled to the compensation."
If it was found as a fact that the original contract was oral, it is
difficult to follow the court's argument. In Joy v. Boston Penny
Savings Bank,27 where the party-wall contract was oral, it was held
that the agreement could not run with the land. It may be that .the
fact in Rugg v. Lemley was otherwise than as alleged in the inter-
venor's bill.
CoLORADO. In Crater v. McCormick,2 8 it was held, under the
facts before the court, that the right to receive payment was per-
sonal to the builder, but the contract was drawn in such manner that
it was clearly apparent that the provisions regarding payment were
intended to be personal.
DISTRICT OV COLUMBIA. It was held in Eberly v. Behrend,
29 that
the owner of the non-builder's lot at the time use was made of the
wall must pay one-half the value thereof to the then owner of the
2z i"S Mass. 6o.
^4 Colo. x96.
20 2o D. C. 215.
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builder's lot. This decision, however, was controlled by, building
regulations of the District.
G oRG . An oral agreement was entered into by R and B, ad-
joining owners, whereby it was agreed that B should build a party-
wall and that R should pay for one-half of so much of the wall as
he should use when he should build upon his lot. B built the wall
and sold his lot to A. R; without having built on his lot, and there-
fore without having used the wall, also conveyed to A. B thereupon
sued R to recover one-half the cost of the wall. A testified that he
paid R more for his lot because of the presence of the wall. It was
held that, inasmuch as no time was specified within which R was to
use the wall, he was to use it within a reasonable time, that having
sold his lot without making use of the wall he had put it out of his
power tQ do so, and that therefore B was entitled to recover on the
contract.8 0 Perhaps not a great deal of weight should be attached
to this holding on the question of the running of the agreements
with the land, for a parol contract at common law was incapable
of being attached to land so as to bind subsequent owners thereof,
'
and it is a matter of considerable doubt whether at the present time
it is possible to make a purely oral contract run with the land, except
possibly in equity81
ILL, INoIs. Some of the cases in this State may seem, upon
cursory examination, not in harmony with each other, but it is be-
lieved that a careful examination of the facts in these cases will
show that they develop a doctrine consistent at least with themselves.
In Roche v. Ullman,"'. it appeared that the complainant and defend-
ant's vendor, owners of adjoining lots, entered into a party-wall
contract, the complainant to build the wall and the defendant's
vendor to pay for same upon making use thereof. The contract
provided expressly that the agreements and the terms thereof should
be deemed binding on heirs and assigns, etc., and that the provisions
thereof should run with the land. The defendant, having purchased
the lot of the non-building owner, made use of the wall, whereupon
a bill in equity was filed by complainant, the builder, against the
defendant to recover compensation for use of the wall according to
contract. It was held that complainant should recover. The court
by Mr. Justice MuIrxKY, said (p. I9):
"But outside of the equitable views here suggested, we
think the law is with appellee on other grounds. While the
authorities are not altogether harmonious with respect to the
a* Rawsonv. Bell, 46 Ga. xg.
USee discussion and cases cited in Sims, Covenants, p. x88, et seq.
82104 Ill. xr.
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legal effect of covenants and agreements providing for the
construction of party-walls between adjoining proprietors, yet
we think the decided weight of authority establishes the
proposition that an agreement under the hands and seali of
such parties, containing covenants and stipulations like those
found in the instrument we are considering, will, when duly
delivered and acted upon, as was done in this case, create
cross-easements in the respective owners of the adjacent lots
with which the covenants in the agreement will run, so as to
bind all persons succeeding to the estates to which such ease-
ments are appurtenant, etc."
This case was followed in Harris v. Dozier.83
In Gibson v. Holden,34 it was held that the right to compensation
for use of the wall according to the contract was personal with the
builder, and that the vendee of the builder could not claim such com-
pensation. In this case, however, it appeared that it was the in-
tention of the parties that immediately upon building the wall its
ownership was severed. Therefore the right of the builder was a
personal right, as for money advanced or property sold, which
would not and could not pass to his vendees merely as such. This
distinction was pointed out in Tomblin v. Fish35 and in McChesney
v. Davis38 wherein the vendee of the builder was allowed to recover.
The same distinction was made and Tomblin v. Fish referred to as
a "well considered case" in Mickel v.: York3 7 in which it was held
that the building owner, in the absence of a contrary intention ap-
pearing, owns the entire wall until the same is used by the adjoining
owner, together with a permanent right of support upon the neigh-
bor's lot. Mickel v. York on this point was followed-in Beidler v.
King.3
s8
INDIANA. In Bloch v. Isham"9 it was held that the plaintiff, the
vendee of the builder's lot, could not recover one-half the cost of a
party-wall which the contract provided should be paid by the non-
builder, his heirs and assigns, the other party to the contract appear-
ing to have used the wall after- the plaintiff had purchased the land
of the builder. The court in the course of its opinion said:
3 72 II. App. 542.
"xx5 Ill. 199, 3 N. ] . 282.
"x8 Ill. App. 439.
86 I1. App. 38o.
1 575 IlL 62.
8 209 Ill. 3o2. See also holding to same effect, Glover v. Mersman, 4 Mo. App. go;
Brown v. McKee, 57 N. Y. 684; Gorham v. Gross, 125 Mass. 232, 240.
13 28 Ind. 37.
AGREEMENTS TO PAY FOR PARTY-WALLS 201
"Schenck and Isham (the original owners) were not ten-
ants in common of the party-wall, but each owned the part
thereof on his side of the line. Schenck advanced the money
to build Isham's moiety, on the agreement of the latter that
he, or his heirs, would repay it when he or they should have
occasion to use the wall. This is clearly a mere personal
covenant, in nowise connected with, or affecting the enjoy-
ment of, the lot conveyed to Bloch (the plaintiff)."
It is apparent from the above that the conclusion of the court in
this case was based on the proposition that each one of the original
owners, the contracting parties, owned one-half of the wall from
the start and that there then arose between them the purely personal
relation of debtor and creditor. The doctrine of this case, however,
is materially modified by the later case of Conduitt v. Ross.
40
In the last named case Ross and Hauck, who were adjoining
owners, entered into a party-wall contract, Ross to build the wall
and Hauck, his heirs, etc., to pay Ross for one-half the cost thereof'
when he (Hauck), his heirs, etc., used same. Ross conveyed his
lot, but reserved the right to receive payment for the use of existing
party-walls. Conduitt became the owner of the Hauck lot and
used the wall which had been built by Ross, and thereupon this
action was brought, on the contract between Ross and Hauck, by
Ross against Conduitt on the ground that the contract to pay, for
half of the cost of the party-wall ran with the land. The court held
that the contract did run with the land so as to obligate Conduitt to
pay for the wall according -to the terms of the contract. The court
said:
"By the contract under consideration, MTs. Ross acquired.
the right to enter upon the Hauck lot and erect and perma-
nently maintain thereon a party-wall. This was a grant to-
her of an interest in land, and was of such a character that'a
perpetual covenant might be annexed to it. * * *
"In consideration of this grant to her she covenanted to
do an act beneficial to the remaining interest of Hauck; that
act was the erection of a wall so situated as that one-half of
it should rest on the margin of his lot, and the other half on
hers, thus devoting each estate to the mutual support of the
party-wall. She at the same time covenanted that when she
should be reimbursed one-half of the cost of the wall, he, or
his grantees, should acquire a reciprocal interest in her lot,
and in legal effect become owners of one-half the party-wall.
So102 Ind. x66.
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"This agreement created what has been aptly termed mutual
or cross-easements in favor of each in the lot of the other,
and was an arrangement mutually beneficial to both proper-
ties. Fitch v. Johnson, lO4 Ill. III; Roche v. Ullman, lO4 Ill.
ixi; Bronson v. Coffin, io8 Mass. 175 (1i Am. Rep. 335);
Thompson v. Curtis, 28 Iowa 229."
On rehearing the court pointed out that it had been held in Bloch
v. Isham, that the right to receive compensation for the use of the
party-wall was personal to the builder, and that there was no inten-
tion on the part of the court to question the soundness of that
conclusion.
It thus appears that in Indiana the burden runs with the non-
builder's lot, at least if apt words are used to indicate that such is
the intention, and that the right to receive compensation does not
run with the land of the builder. In Conduitt v. Ross the question
of who was entitled to receive the payment of one-half the cost of
the party-wall was not involved, for Mrs. Ross at the time she sold
her lot reserved the right to receive all such payments. As herein-
before stated -it is believed that if the court was of the view,
as indicated in the above quoted extract from the court's
opinion, that upon payment being inade the non-builder, his heirs or
assigns, then became owners of one-half the wall, it must necessarily
follow that in the absence of an express reservation of the right to
receive payment, as in the Conduitt case, such payment must be made
to the owner of the builder's lot at the time the wall is used. On the
other hand, if the relation of the parties created by the party-wall
contract is of the nature pointed out in Bloch v. Isham, then it is
believed that the payment must be made by and to the original con-
tracting parties, on the ground that the contract is then purely per-
sonal in its nature, and not of such a character as that it may be
annexed to land so as to bind subsequent owners thereof merely as
such owners.
IowA. The subject is regulated by statute. § 2994 et seq of
CODX oV 1897. . It has been held that the right to receive compensa-
tion is with the owner of the builder's lot at the time the party-wall
is used by the adjoining owner.4' And it would seem that the owner
of the non-builder's lot at the time the wall is used is obligated t6
make the payment.
KANSAS. In -the rather recent case of Southworth v. Perring,
42
the Supreme Court of Kansas was called upon for the first -time to
4' Thompson v. Curtis. 28 Ia. 229. See also Zugenbuhler v. Gilliam, 3 Ia. 391; Ber-
tram v. Curtis. .z 1a. 46; Percival v. Ins. Co., xri N. W. 941.
a 71 Kan. 755. 81 Pac. 481. 82 Pac. 785. 2 I R A (N. S.) 87.
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consider this troublesome question. The contract there sued upon
provided expressly that "The parties hereto bind and obligate their
heirs, executors, administrators and assigns to the fulfillment of all
the terms and covenants of this agreement." The lots of both parties
to the agreement had been sold before any use was made of the wall
by the non-builder, so that the court was called upon to consider both
whether the burden ran and whether the right to receive compensa-
tion passed -to the grantee of the builder's lot. The court, after a
careful examination of the authorities, concluded that both benefit
and burden passed to the subsequent owners. In the course of the
opinion the court said:
"*** .the question whether the right to receive payment
on account of the party-wall passes with successive grants of
the land is a more difficult one than whether the obligation to
make the payment devolves upon the person who joins to the
party-wall. It is easier to find support in reason and author-
ity for holding that the obligation to make payment runs with
the land than for holding that the right to receive payment
does."
Again:
"Without attempting to declare what general principles re-
lating to the question presented are sustained by the greater
number of decisions, we shall decide it upon these considera-
tions: We regard con-tracts of the character of that here
involved as in their nature so related to the real property
affected, and .so adapted to impose their obligations and be-
stow their benefits upon the successors in title of -the hLnd-
owners by whom they are made, that the purpose that they
shall have that effect is readily to be inferred from the em-
ployment of language having any substantial tendency in that
direction. In the present case we hold that the use of the
clause making the terms of the contract binding upon the
heirs, executors, administrators, and assigns of the parties
sufficiently indicates that intention. What the effect of the
omission of that provision might have 'been, we do not now
determine."
KiNTUcKY. In Ferguson v. Worra143 it was held that the obli-
.gation to pay for the party-wall according to the provisions of the
contract passed to successive owners of the non-builder's lot. The
court clearly indicated that the benefit would also pass to the grantee
s3x Ky. I.- Rep. 2ig. xoi S. W. 966, 9 I R A (N. S.) x26x.
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6f the builder. "The Wall was designed to enhance and make more
convenient the use of both the lots. Each of the adjacent owners
had a defined, fixed interest in the wall. It was as firmly attached
to and a part of each lot as any building erected on either of them
could be. And the benefits and burdens attaching to the wall fol-
lowed the ownership of the respective lots." The court thus indi-
cates -that although each one of the contracting parties owns his
half of the wall the contract created rights and obligations which
ran with the respective lots.
LOUISIANA. The Iowa statute above referred to was taken from
the Louisiana Code. Cases from the latter State and in accord with
the doctrine of the Iowa cases are Durel v. Boisblanc;4" Murrell v.
Fowler;4 Bruning v. N. 0. C. & B. Co. ;46 Lavillebeuvre v. Cos-
grove.4 7
MASSAC HUSXTTS. In the leading case of Savage v. Mason 8 the
court held that covenants regarding the building, use, and payment
for such use of party-walls, contained in a deed of partition, created
rights and obligations which ran with the land into the hands of
subsequent owners. The reason for so holding was stated by the
court as follows:
"* * * There was privity of estate between the covenant-
ing parties in the land to which the covenant was annexed.
the covenant is in terms between the parties and their re-
spective heirs and assigns; it has direct and immediate refer-
ence to the land; it relates to -the mode of occupying and
.enjoying the land; it is beneficial to the owner as owner, and
to no other-pt.rson; it is in truth inherent in and attached to
the land, and necessarily goes with the land into the hands
of the heir or assignee."
In Maine v. Cumstoi 4g the party-wall contract, it was held, did
not create covenants running with the land for the reason that the
contract was not signed and sealed by the defendant's grantor, one
of the original contracting parties. It was held, however, that the
defendant as grantee of the non-builder was liable to pay one-half
the cost of the wall as upon an implied contract, on the theory that
the entire wall until used by the adjoining owner, was the property
of the builder or his grantees. This doctrine was followed in Stand-
" i La. Ann. 407.
4'3 La. Ann. x66.
"x2 La. Am. 541.
4 13 La. Ann. 324.
43 Cush. Soo.
49 98 Mass. 3z7.
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ish v. Lawrence." In-Richardson v. Tobey5l the court held that the
owners at the time of the use were subject to the burdens and entitled
to the benefits according to the doctrine of Savage v. Mason, and that
the -result would be the same whether they followed the authority of
that case or of Maine v. Cumston.
In King v. Wight" it appeared -that adjoining owners had entered.
into a party-wall contract under seal whereby it was provided that
either party might build a wall, the other to pay, upon using the wall,
for one-half the cost of erecting the same. -Both lots were sold after
a- wall had been built, and after the conveyances the wall was used
by the non-builder's grantee. The contract expressly named "heirs
and assigns." It was-held that the covenants ran with the land both
as to burdens and as to benefits. The court indicated that im-
mediately upon the erection of the wall it was owned one-half by
each of the adjoining owners. But in Berry v. Godfrey,53 apparently
-the latest expression by the Massachusetts court upon this point, it
is said:,
"It is equally well settled by decisions in this State and
elsewhere that, until it is appropriated by the adjacent owner
under the contract, it is the property of him who built it, and,
'that, so far as it stands on the land of -his neighbor, it is law-
fully maintained there under a license which preserves to the
builder all his rights of property in it."
It thus seems quite clear that the law in Massachusetts is to the
effect that both benefits and burdens pass with the land, if there is
privity of estate, if the contract is under seal signed by the parties,
and if apt words are used to indicate that it is the intention that the
covenants shall run. The doctrine stated is not shaken by the de-
cision in Lincoln v. Burrage,54 sometimes referred to as standing for
a different rule. Under the facts of that case there can be no doubt
that the court correctly held that the covenant sued upon did not
run with the land.
MICHIGAN. Both benefits and burdens run with the land if such
appears to be the intention.5 5 The contract under consideration in
the case cited. expressly bound the heirs and assigns of the parties,
and provided that the agreements of the parties should be construd
as covenants running with the land; there was also a clause that
0xxx Mass. xio.
U 121 Mass. 457.
52 155 Mass. 444.
13 198 Mass. 228. 84 N. ]. 304.
"77 Mass. 378, 52 1, R A zio.
5 Adams v. Noble. x2o Mich. 545. 79 N. W. 81o.
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when the non-builder should pay one-half the cost of the wall he
should then have a joint interest therein. In concluding that the
covenants ran with the land the court laid stress upon this latter
clause.
MINmuOTA. In Kimm v. Griffin"8 the court held that the benefits
and burdens both ran with the land. This case was followed in
National Life Ins. Co. v. Lee,57 in which case the court said:
"*** * By the terms of the party-wall contract, the pay-
ment of one-half the value-not the cost--of the part of the
wall proposed to be used was expressly made a condition
precedent to its use. The only fair and rational construction
of the contract is that the whole wall was to remain the prop-
erty of Glessner (the builder), his heirs or assigns, subject to
the right of Day (the non-builder), his heirs or assigns, to
purchase so much of it as he or they might desire to use by
paying one-half of its value, when-and not till then-he or
they would acquire title to one-half of the wall.
"This wall was appurtenant to lot 8, and as such all the
right, title or interest of Glessner in it passed to plaintiff,
under the title to that lot acquired under, etc."
In this case the contract under consideration provided that the agree-
ments should be perpetual and run with the land.
Mississippi. Apparently the only decision involving the phase
of party-wall law under discussion is that in Mayer v. Martin.s
There, however, .the contract considered was a mere parol agree-
ment, and the court held that the provisions thereof did not ex.-end
to subsequent owners. The court observed that if the agreement
did run, payment would have to be made to the owner of the lot with
the wall at the time the wall was used and not to the .subsequent
vendee of such then owner. I
MissouRi. In Hulinq v. Chester9 it was assumed for the pur-
poses of the case that the obligation-to make payment passed with -the
land of the non-builder. On the ground that the right to compensa-
tion was personal to -the builder, the plaintiff, who sued as heir of
the builder, was not, however, allowed to recover. Whether the
failure to name "heirs and assigns" of the builder had any ;nfluence
upon the court's conclusion does not appear. In a case decided the
same year the supreme court held that party-wall contracts of the
nature under consideration could not run with the land at law be-
14 67 Minn. 2s. 69 N. W. 634.
B7; 5inn. 15;7. 77 N' . W. 794.
53 83 Miss. 322, 35 South. 218.
9 zg Mo. App. 607.
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cause- there was no privity of estate; but the action was in equity,
and the court held that. the grantee of the non-builder was liable on
the contract for the reason that he took with notice thereof.8 0
NXBRAsKA. In a number of cases it was held that the obligation
to pay passed to and bouid subsequent owners.61 In Cook v. Paul6 2
it was held that the grantee of the builder was not entitled to receive
payment under the party-wall contract as against the assignee of the
builder. Whether or not the burden of making payments passed to
the grantee of the non-builder was not involved, but the broad rule
was laid -down that in neither aspect could the agreements run.
But in Loyal Mystic Legion v. Jones"3 tle court refused to recognize
the doctrine of Cook v* Paul as authorative or binding, and held that
under the facts there presented both benefit and burden ran with
the land. It should be noted that the contract provided that pay-
ment should be made to the builders "or their grantees," which
fact the court was of opinion distinguished the case- before them
from those cases in which it appeared that paymedtt was to be made
to the builder or his assigns.
Nzw YoRK. Perhaps the decisions in no State have had so much
influence upon the development of the law on this subject as those'
of New York. In some of -the early cases it was held that the
covenants ran with the land.6' But in 1873 in the leading case of
Cole v. Hughes"5 it was held -that neither burden nor benefit ran
with the land. Judge tmn, who wrote the opinion of the court,
was of opinion that the right to receive payment was personal to
the builder, and that, inasmuch as no interest in the non-builder's
land had been granted, there was no p'rivity of estate and that
therefore the burden of payment could not run. Because of the
wide influence of this case the following extract from the opinion'
of Judge EAaI. is given:
c* * * When Dean (the builder) conveyed he conveyed
all his interest in the lot, and, as appurtenant thereto, in the
party-wall. For this interest the grantee paid, and he got
all he paid for. There can be no reason in equity why he
should also receive payment for some portion of the cost
of building the party-wall. * * * The money to be paid was
not for anything done upon the Dean lot, but for something
00 Sharp v. Cheatam, 88 Mo. 498. Followed in Keating v. Korthage, 88 Mo. 524, 532.
' Burr v. Lamaster, 3o Neb. 688; Stehr v. Raben, 33 Neb. 437; Jordan v. Kraft, 33
Neb. 844; Garmire v. Willy, 36 Neb. 340.
024 Neb. (UnoL) 93. 93 N. W. 430, 66 1,. R. A. 673.
63 73 Neb. 342, 102 N. W. 62!.
"Weyman v. Ringold, i Bradf. 40; Keteltas v. Penfold, 4 B. D. Smith 122.
0 S4 N. Y. 444.
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done upon the Vorhees (the non-builder's) lot, and it no
more passed to his grantee than it would if he had built a
house upon the Vorhees lot, using the party-wall, and Vor-
hees had agreed to pay him whenever he or his heirs or
assigns should use oroccupy it."
Again on page 447:
"The next important question to be considered is, whether
the agreement of Vorhees to compensate Dean ran with the
Vorhees lot, so as tor bind his subsequent grantees. I do not
think it did. At the time Vorhees made the covenant he re-
ceived no interest in land and granted none. He simply as-
sented that Dean might build one-half of. the wall upon his
land, and then he agreed in a certain contingency, which might
or mightnot happen, that 'he would compensate him. He did not
convey to Dean any land upon which the wall was built. They
continued to own the land, as before, in severalty, and, except
for the agreement, Vorhees could have used the party-wall
at any time without making compensation. (Sherred v. Cisco,
4 Sand. Sup. C. R. 48o; Partridge v. Gilbert, 15 N. Y. 6Ol; 2
WASHBURN, REAL PROPERTY, 334.)
"Dean's right to compensation was in no way charged upon
the Vorhees lot. There was, therefore, no privity of estate,
between Vorhees and Dean."
Cole v. Hughes was followed in Scott v. McMillan8 and in Hart v.
Lyon..
8 '
In Mott v. Oppenheimer8 it was held that both the right -to re-
ceive compensation and the obligation to pay passed to the succes-
sive owners of the lots of the contracting parties. The seeming
conflict in the holding in this case -with the'rule of Cole v. Hughds
and the cases following it was explained in Sebald v. Mulholland9
on the ground that in the Cole case it was contemplated by -the
parties and provided by the contract that one of the parties was to
build and the other to pay for the wall, while in the Mott case the
contract provided that either one of the parties might build and that
,the other should pay. The form of the contract in fhe Cole case, it
was held, indicated that the rights and obligations were purely per-
sonal, and that merely privity of contract was created thereby, while
in the Mott case the contract looked to the future and a privity of
"76 N. Y. r4i
7go N. Y. 663.
a35 N. Y. 3z2.
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estate was created. In the late case of Crawford v. Krollpfeiffer"
the court approved the doctrines of the Cole and Mott cases and
affirmed the distinction pointed out in Sebald v. Mulholland. Thus it
seems that if the parties will be careful to omit any specification of
the party that is to build the wall and will draw their contract along
the lines of the contract considered in Mott v. Oppenheimer, there
will be no difficulty in passing the rights and obligations on to the
subsequent owners. 1
OHIo. In Platt v .EgglestonT2 the court was called upon to decide
whether the payment for one-half the cost of a party-wall should
be made to the builder of the wall or to his grantees. The court
considered the entire-wall, together with the easement of support
upon the adjoining lot, a's appurtenant to the lot of the builder, liable,
however, to be subjected, under the agreement, to a burden for the
benefit of the adjoining premises. "But when," said the court, "the
property was subjected to such use by the adjoining owners, it was
to be paid for. The right was not exercised until Wilson and
Eggleston became owners of the property; and, it seems to us, as
their property was required to. bear the burden, they ought to re-
ceive the compensating benefit, and that this may fairly be presumed
to have been in accordance with the intention of the parties to the
original agreement." That the burden also should run was the
conclusion of the court in Mithoff v. Hughes.78 And in Hall v.
Geyer" the court said that a party-wall contract was one having
"reference to land, and concerning title and rights in land, and of
such nature and import as readily indicates its character and fixes
its place in the classification of contracts, as one of those which,
in legal parlance and in consonance with the great weight of the de-
cisions on the subject, are denominated 'contracts or covenants run-
ning with the land."'
PENNSYLVANIA. By an act passed in 1721 it was provided that
"the first builder shall be reimbursed one moiety of the charge of
such party-wall, or for so much thereof as the next builder shall
have occasion to make use of, etc." Under this act the courts neces-
sarily had to 'hold the right to compensation a chose in action per-
sonal to the first builder.75 In Hart v. Kucher 6 it was pointed out
195 N. Y. 18S.
Some of the later cases in the lower New York Courts are Duer v. Fox, 60 N. Y.
Supp. s8o; Frick v. Bauer, 8z N. Y. SuPP. 625; Schwenker v. Picken, 86 N. Y. Supp.
681; Morris v. Burr, iz2 N. Y. Supp. 243.
12 o Oh. St. 414.
7s$ 0. C. C. 120.
A 1 40. C. C. 229.
2 5Todd v. Stokes, io Barr. 155; Gilbert v. Drew id. 219.
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that this chose in action idea was based on the act of 1721. By an
act passed in 1849 the law was changed so that the right to receive
compensation passed to the first builder's grantees. Of this later
act the court said:
"This is making the interest to be in law what it always was
in fact, an interest in the realty, and not a mere personal
right."7
TXAS. In Nalli v. Paggi,78 an oral agreement to pay a portion
of the cost of erecting a party-wall, entered into when the wall was
partially built, was held not to run with the land, so as to bind a
subsequent owner of the adjoining lot. The court cited and quoted
from Cole v. Hughes on the point that there was no privity of estate
and no interest in the land created by the agreement.
WASHIrTON. Hoffman v. Dickson"9 held that the party-wall
contract involved in the case created an incumbrance on the lot of
the non-builder, and that the incumbrance could not be discharged
until the wall was used, for not until then could it be known to whom
payment should be made. And in Sandberg v. Rowland80 it was held
that the burden and the benefit both ran, it appearing that such was
the intention of the parties. These cases were considered as binding
authority in the very recent case of Hawkes v. Hoffman.8'
WsIST VIRGIIA. A party-wall contract which expressly named
"heirs and assigns" and provided in terms that it should run with
the land was held in Parsons v. Baltimore B. & L. Assoc.82 not to
have created agreements running with the land either as to benefits
or as to burdens, beyond an equitable charge imposed upon the non-
builder's lot from the start. In support of the proposition that the
agreements did not run with the land so as to -bind subsequent
owners personally, the court relied upon the authority of the New
York cases referred to above.
ONTARIo. In Kenny v. Mackenzie"" the court held that the right
to receive compensation did not pass to the grantee of the builder.
The cohclusion of the court was based on the ground that the agree-
ment in the respect under consideration did not touch or concern
the land.
ENlGLAND. The general question seems to have been considered
"Knight v. Beenken, 30 Pa. 372. See also Voight v. Wallace, 179 Pa. St. 520.
Is81 Tex. 20X. x6 S. W. 932, 1 L. R. A. 33.
47 Wash. 431; 92 Pac. 272, 93 Pac. 523, 125 Am. St. Rep. 907.
o s 5x Wash. 7, 97 Pac. 2o87.
8156 Wash. 120, xo5 Pac. x56, 24 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1038.
L44 W. Va 335, 29 S. 3 . 999, 67 Am. St. Rep. 769.
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for the first and only time in a reported case in Irving v. Turnbull.
8"
It was there held that when an estate had been laid out in plots for
building upon the condition (inter alia) that the purchaser of a plot
first building a party-wall is -to be repaid by the purchaser of the
adjoining plot one-half of the value of the party-wall, and the
original purchasers of plots sell their plots, either built upon or
vacant, to other purchasers, an implied contract arises between these
sub-purchasers of adjoining plots, that, as between them, the sub-
purchaser of a vacant plot, adjoinging a plot on which a house has
already been built by an original purchaser, when he builds his house
up to the house already built and makes use of its gable walls, shall
pay to the then owner of the house, and not to the original builder,
the half cost of the party gable wall. Thus the relations of the
parties were there worked out on the basis of an implied contract,
and not on the 'basis of covenants running with the land. The court
took especial pains to point out -that the payment should be made to
the then owner of the builder's lot and not to the original builder
himself, and principally on the fact that the entire wall belonged to
the builder and the successive owners of his lot.
It appears, then, that in by far the greater number of States it is
held that the covenants may properly be classed as running cove-
nants. In a few it has been held that while the obligation to pay
will run, the benefit, or the right to receive payment, is personal.
This distinction, unless founded upon the wording of the agreemeit,
is, it is believed, unsound. And in three or four States it is held that
neither benefit nor burden may run with the land, unless perhaps, as
in New York, the covenant is drawn along the lines laid down in
Mott v. Oppenheimer.8" However it is unfortunate that the courts
in many of -the cases have not placed their decisions on grounds more
satisfactory and unassailable.
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